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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chul Boylon Gibbs appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered as the result of a traffic stop conducted on Interstate 84. He asserts his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when the officer deviated from the original purpose of the stop
to take time to call for a drug-detection dog. The district court agreed the officer had deviated
from the original purpose of the stop when he called for the drug dog; however, the court held
that extending the stop was justified based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s
occupants were engaged in criminal activity.
On appeal, Mr. Gibbs argues the extension of the stop was unjustified and that the district
court’s order denying suppression should be reversed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While patrolling I-84 at about 6 o’clock on a rainy February evening, Officer Jason Cagle
observed an Audi passenger sedan traveling eastbound with what he believed to be the car’s
steering rods hanging down and dragging on the roadway. (R., p.194; 3/2/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.9-13;
9/8/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-7.)1 Officer Cagle thought the Audi was unsafe and decided to make a
traffic stop. (R., p.194; 3/2/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.9-13.) From his stationary position in the meridian at
milepost 101, Officer Cagle pulled into the left lane of the Interstate to catch up with the Audi;

1

At suppression hearing held on September 8, 2017, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation,
the district court took judicial notice of the video recording from Officer Cagle’s dash camera
(hereinafter, “Ex. A”), the transcript of the preliminary hearing conducted in Mr. Gibbs’ case on
March 2, 2017 (hereinafter, “3/2/17 Tr.”), and the transcript of the preliminary hearing in State v.
Junge, Elmore County Case No. CR-2017-274, held February 22, 2017 (hereinafter, “Aug.Tr.”).
(See 9/8/17 Tr., 7, L.3 – p.9, L.12; R. p.117.) A copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing
in State v. Junge is being augmented in the record by Appellant’s Motion to Augment, filed
contemporaneously with Appellant’s Brief.
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the officer “wanted to pull him over as quick as possible before we had a crash.” (9/8/17
Tr., p.25, Ls.6-19.) There were cars and trucks between them, including semi-trucks on the
right, and it was raining hard; however, the officer soon caught up with the Audi, which had just
pulled into the right lane in front of a semi-truck. (Ex.A, 17:58:31-17:59:30; 9/8/17 Tr., p.25,
Ls.11-15.) Officer Cagle then moved into the space directly behind the Audi and immediately
activated the patrol car’s overhead lights. (Ex.A, 17:59:28-31; Tr., p.25, Ls.10-15.) The Audi’s
right turn signal was already on, and once the officer pulled his patrol car onto the shoulder to
indicate he wanted the Audi to move over, the Audi did likewise. (Ex.A, 17:59:43–18:00:08;
9/8/17 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.) The semi-truck that had been traveling in the same lane behind them
passed by, continuing in the right lane. (Ex.A, 18:00:05-10.) Both vehicles came to a complete
stop on the shoulder of the interstate within 40 seconds from the time Officer Cagle activated his
lights behind the Audi. (Ex.A, 17:59:28 – 18:00:08.)
Officer Cagle got out of his patrol car and walked up to the Audi from behind.
(R., p.105.) He noticed the passenger-side windows were lowered slightly and the sunroof was
raised, at an angle, in the back. (Aug.Tr., p.5, Ls.2-3; R., pp.105, 109.) The officer observed
three occupants in the Audi: the driver, Brandon Stevenson; Mr. Gibbs in the front passenger’s
seat; and Mr. Gibbs’ girlfriend, Tiffany Junge, seated in the back. (9/8/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.11-19.)
Officer Cagle described all three as “rapidly puffing on freshly-lit cigarettes.” (9/8/17 Tr., p.12,
Ls.2-6; R., p.105.) Officer Cagle spoke with the driver about the item hanging from the car and
requested the driver’s license and vehicle information. (R., p.105.) The driver did not have his
driver’s license card but provided the officer his license number and date of birth, and also
produced the vehicle’s registration and insurance documents. (R., p.106.)
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Officer Cagle returned to his patrol car and, after he was seated, promptly called dispatch
to request a drug detection dog. (Ex.A, 18:03:08; R., pp.105, 109.) The call lasted just under 30
seconds. (Ex.A, 18:04:06-18:04:32; R., p.109.) After he had completed the call, Officer Cagle
began to run the license and registration checks.

(Ex.A, 18:04:33; Aug.Tr., p.32, Ls.25;

R., pp.105, 109.) After the license checks returned as “clear,” Officer Cagle walked back to the
Audi to talk with the driver about making the vehicle acceptable to drive. (9/8/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.210; R., p.105.) Meanwhile, the K-9 unit officer arrived and the drug dog alerted on the vehicle.
(9/8/17 Tr., p.47, Ls.9-24.) Based on the evidence discovered as a result of the ensuing search,
the State charged Mr. Gibbs’ with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.18-22.)
Mr. Gibbs filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that his detention as a
passenger in the vehicle was unreasonably extended, in violation of his constitutional rights,
when Officer Cagle deviated from the original purpose of the traffic stop to call for the drug dog,
without reasonable suspicion of any drug crime. (R., pp.68-76.) The State filed a brief objecting
to the motion, arguing there was no deviation and that Officer Cagle had a reasonable suspicion
that justified calling for the drug dog. (R., pp.86-88.) The Sate alternatively argued that, even if
there was a Fourth Amendment violation, suppression was unwarranted because of the
“inevitable discovery doctrine” and because of the “good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.” (R., pp.86-88.)
At the suppression hearing, Officer Cagle cited to numerous behaviors that made him
“suspicious.” He thought the Audi “was very slow to pull over” and that from his training and
experience he concluded the occupants “were potentially trying to hide stuff.” (9/8/17 Tr., p.27,
Ls.18-22). The officer also testified he was suspicious because, when he walked up to the Audi
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he noticed the windows on the passenger’s side of the car were open four to six inches and the
back of the sunroof was raised at an angle; he also saw all three occupants “rapidly puffing on
freshly lit cigarettes.” (9/8/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-23.) Officer Cagle testified that he believed the
occupants were “trying to fill the interior of that car with the odor of cigarette smoke to hide
potential odors of alcohol, marijuana, meth, cocaine, and any other type of illegal activity in the
vehicle. Cover the odor.” (9/8/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7.)
Officer Cagle also testified that the occupants’ talking – and not talking – created
reasonable suspicion:
The behavior of the occupants in the vehicle, the driver was overtalkative. He
was like a salesman trying to – trying just to overtalk. Which is nerve – shows
nervousness to me. Ms. Junge [the passenger in the backseat] wouldn’t even look
at me. She was very – you could tell she was very – appeared to be scared and
very, very nervous. Should wouldn’t even look at me.
Mr. Chul Gibbs, in the front right seat, was – he was – he wasn’t either one. He
wasn’t overtalkative and – and on occasion he would look at me. But looked –
and had very … when my – my definition is felony nervous look on his face.
(9/8/17 Tr., p.28, L.8 – p.30, L.2 (emphasis added).)
Officer Cagle gave further reasons to justify his suspicion: the occupants seemed to be
liars because one had answered they were going to Twin Falls and the other had corrected him
saying “Jackpot” – although the officer acknowledged most people travel through Twin Falls to
get to Jackpot (9/8/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.14-25; p.39, Ls.9-11); the route to Jackpot – Highway 93 –
“is a known drug corridor” (9/8/17 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-5); the driver did not possess his physical
driver’s license but surprisingly knew his license number (9/8/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-13); the
occupants were not in “business dress” and he observed marks and tattoos he thought were
typical of drug users (9/8/17 Tr., p.35, Ls.23-25); that Mr. Gibbs’ “appeared to be like somebody
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that’s in the drug life” (9/8/17 Tr., p.35, Ls.8-10); and “they [the occupant’s] looked guilty to me.
They looked to be drug users to me” (9/8/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.15-18). Officer Cagle also stated,
After 25 years of being in this profession, I have got a pretty good eye for some
people who are drug users and – and people that are not. And although it’s not
100 percent, it’s usually pretty accurate.
(9/8/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.10-13.)
On cross-examination, Officer Cagle admitted, however, that he saw no suspicious
driving pattern, no furtive or other movements inside the car – other than cigarette smoking –
and he did not detect any drug odor before calling for the drug dog. (9/8/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-11.)
There also was no testimony that Officer Cagle had observed any sign of driving impairment nor
any sign that any occupant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (See generally, 9/8/17
Tr.)
The district court denied suppression. (R., pp.104-17.) In its written memorandum
decision and order, the district court agreed that Officer Cagle had deviated from the purpose of
the traffic stop and had initiated a new investigation when he took time to call for a K-9 unit.
(R., p.110.) The district court then turned to the question of whether extending the detention to
begin a drug investigation was supported by reasonable suspicion. (R., p.110.) The district court
addressed and rejected most of the “factors” that Officer Cagle offered to provide reasonable
suspicion. However, the district court plucked out three behaviors which, it concluded, gave rise
to a reasonable suspicion: (1) the Audi’s slow response (20 seconds to move onto the shoulder)
to the patrol car’s activated emergency lights, which the court found was “consistent with” the
driver intentionally delaying his contact with law enforcement; (2) the occupants’ puffing
“rapidly” on freshly-lit cigarettes, which is “not typical of the way most people smoke,” raised
an inference that the occupants were “trying to fill the vehicle with smoke in order to mask the
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odor of some type of contraband”; and (3) the Audi’s sunroof was cracked open and its door
windows were slightly lowered on a cold and rainy evening, indicating that the occupants were
“attempting to air out the car in an effort to mask or eliminate the odor of some type of
contraband.” (R., pp.115-16.) The district court concluded that these three behaviors gave rise
to a reasonable suspicion of drug activity, justifying Officer Cagle in extending the occupants’
detention while he called for the drug-detection dog to investigate. (R., p.116.)2
Mr. Gibbs then entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.121, 123, 126; 11/13/17 Tr., p.55, Ls.1-6.)
On the drug possession count, the district court granted him a suspended sentence of three and
one-half years, with one and one-half years’ fixed, and placed him on five years’ probation; on
the paraphernalia count, the court ordered a fine, only. (R., pp.139-48; 3/26/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.48.) Mr. Gibbs filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.149.)

2

The district court did not address or make alternative rulings on the State’s “inevitable
discovery” or “good faith” arguments. (See generally, R., pp.104-07.)
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gibbs’ motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gibbs’ Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Officer Cagle violated Mr. Gibbs’ Fourth Amendment rights when, without reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity, the officer deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop to call for
a drug-detection dog. The district court correctly concluded that making the call extended
Mr. Gibbs’ detention; however, the court erred in holding the extension was justified by
reasonable suspicion.

Contrary to the district court’s holding, the facts in this case are

insufficient to support an objective, reasonable suspicion that the occupants were involved in
criminal activity. The innocent and common behaviors observed in this case – a passenger sedan
taking 40 seconds to pull into and stop on the shoulder of heavily-traveled I-84, on a rainy
evening, and the “rapid” smoking of passengers with the windows are partially lowered – cannot
give rise to a reasonable suspicion as it would subject countless innocent motorists to an invasion
of their privacy for no more than smoking cigarettes or traveling with someone who does.

B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a trial court’s decision granting or denying a suppression motion is bifurcated.

The appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of the historical facts unless they are clearly
erroneous. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016). However, the appellate court will “freely
review the application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. The deference
to the trial court’s factual findings reflects “the trial court’s special role to weigh conflicting
evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.” Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 250 (2018).
However, where the appellate court has exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by
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the district court, the appellate court does not extend the usual deference to the district court’s
evaluation of the evidence. “Under these limited circumstances, the appellate court’s role is to
freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court would
do.” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 492 (2017).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Suppression Because The Extension Of The
Traffic Stop Was Not Supported By Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States provides that “[t]he right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth

Amendment protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of
both primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence
later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,
988-98 (1992).
“The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a
‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable
suspicion that a violation had occurred.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez v United
States, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). “A seizure justified only by a police-observed
traffic violation … becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete the mission of the traffic stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). A
drug dog sniff, like other measures directed at detecting crime, are not part of the officer’s traffic
mission. Id., 135 S.Ct. at 1615.
Ultimately, if an officer makes unrelated inquiries or investigations, the officer “will
inevitably lengthen the time” of the traffic stop, see Linze, 161 Idaho at 608; unless the added
9

time is justified by its own reasonable suspicion, the prolonging violates the Fourth Amendment.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. at 1616; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. “This rule is both broad and
inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be
considered de minimis.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. at
1615-16 (emphasis added)).
1.

Officer Cagle’s Call To Request The K-9 Unit Deviated From The Purpose Of
The Traffic Stop And Extended Mr. Gibbs’ Detention

The district court correctly concluded that the police officer deviated from the original
purpose of the traffic stop when he took time to call dispatch to request a drug-detection dog.
(See R., p.109.) The district court found, based on the undisputed evidence presented, that
Officer Cagle called for the drug dog after returning to his patrol car with the driver’s license,
insurance and registration information, but before he began the process of running the checks on
that information. (R., p.109.) The district court held:
Although the delay to request a K-9 unit was brief, there is no de minimis
exception to the rule requiring that the detention of the person be supported by
reasonable suspicion. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16. A deviation from the
original purpose of a traffic stop “will inevitably lengthen the time need to
complete the original purpose of the seizure.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. Further,
“[t]he rule isn’t concerned with when the officer deviates from the original
purpose of the traffic stop, it is concerned with the fact that the officer deviates
from the original purpose of the stop at all. Id. at 609.
When Sergeant Cagle deviated from the original purpose of the traffic stop, he
initiated a “new seizure with a new purpose ... which requires its own
reasonableness.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.
(R., p.110.)
The facts in this case, however, are insufficient to provide the requisite reasonable
suspicion to justify Officer Cagle’s deviation and extension of the stop.
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2.

The Extension Of The Traffic Stop Was Not Justified Because The Facts Viewed
In Their Totality Do Not Support A Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug Activity

An officer’s observations and events succeeding the initial stop may permit extending the
length and scope of a traffic stop, but only if there exist objective and specific articulable facts
that provide the constitutionally-required level of “reasonable suspicion” to justify an
investigative detention. An investigative detention is permissible only if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion “that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). The quantity
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary
to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Still, reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch. Id. at 329. Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before
the time of the detention. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Kelly, 160
Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016). “Reasonable suspicion depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life.” Naverette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014).
As explained below, the behaviors observed by the officer, even in their aggregate, were
not indicative of drug activity or any other criminal conduct and therefore did not justify
extending the stop to conduct a drug investigation.
a.

A Response Time Of 20 Seconds To Pull Onto The Shoulder Of The
Interstate, And 20 Seconds More To Completely Stop, Is Not Indicative
Of Criminal Activity

It took the Audi 20 seconds to move safely from its lane of travel and onto the shoulder
of the Interstate, and then 20 seconds more to arrive safely at a complete stop. (See Ex.A,
17:59:30-18:00:10.) The district court did not find that this was an unusual amount of time, or
that the time or manner of pulling over was other than normal. (See generally, R., pp.104-117.)
11

Rather, the district court found that this amount of time was “consistent with” the driver
intentionally delaying his contact with the police, and concluded, therefore, that it was “a fact
from which the officer may reasonably suspect drug activity.” (R., p.115.) This conclusion was
erroneous for several reasons. First, the time it took for the driver to pull off the interstate is not
indicative of an intent to delay contact with the police. The record shows that Officer Cagle was
trying to catch up with the Audi, even using his flashing lights to have the vehicles between them
move out of his way (see Ex.A, 17:58:31 – 17:59:13), and that Officer Cagle had “wanted to pull
him over as quick as possible before we had a crash” (9/8/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.6-19). However, as
this Court can see by reviewing the identical video that was reviewed by the district court, the
time the Audi took to respond and the manner in which it did so was indicative of ordinary
caution under the circumstances. (See Ex.A, 17:59:30-18:00:10.) First, it is unlikely any driver
would instantly notice the flashing lights in his rearview mirror, particularly given the
circumstances of heavy rain, diminished light, and surrounding vehicles that required the driver’s
attention.3 (See Ex.A, 17:59:30-18:00:10.) Even once noticed, these flashing lights would not
signify Officer Cagle’s urgency and fear of an imminent danger of crash. Rather, any reasonable
driver under these circumstances would be required to exercise due caution and safely pull over;
the video demonstrates that is exactly how the Audi driver behaved in this case.
Upon review of the identical video reviewed by the district court, this Court should
conclude that manner in which the Audi responded after the officer activated his lights is not
indicative of an intentional delay, but reflects a prudent driver using ordinary caution as required
by the circumstances. The video shows the Audi traveling in a pack of vehicles on I-84 with a

3

The State provided no evidence of the actual driving speeds, although the speed limit on the
Interstate is 75 to 80 miles per hour. I.C. § 45-654(1).
12

pickup and a semi-truck behind him. (See Ex.A, 17:59:30-18:00:10.) There was heavy rain and
it was nearing darkness; the Audi’s right-turn signal was already active, having just overtaken
the semi-truck.

(See Ex.A, 17:59:30-18:00:10.)

While the video cannot show how many

seconds elapsed before the driver noticed the flashing lights, it shows, unequivocally, that the
driver pulled off of the interstate within 20 seconds, right after the patrol car had given it the
additional signal to do so by moving over and onto the shoulder. (Ex.A, 17:59:43–18:00:08;
9/8/17 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.)
As demonstrated in the video and as testified to by Officer Cagle, there was no evidence
of impaired or otherwise improper driving. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion (see
R., p.115), the manner of driving is not “a fact from which Sergeant Cagle may reasonably
suspect criminal activity.”
b.

“Rapid Puffing” On Cigarettes While Having The Windows Slightly Open
Did Not Provide Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug Activity

The district court also erred in concluding the occupants’ “rapid puffing” on fresh-lit
cigarettes while having the windows slightly opened raised the inference that the occupants were
trying to mask the odor of some type of contraband and provided the trooper with reasonable
suspicion. In support of this conclusion, the district court cites to State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho
913, 917 (Ct. App. 2001). Brumfield is distinguishable. In Brumfield, the Court of Appeals
noted that the presence of strong odors in vehicles can contribute to reasonable suspicion. Id.
There, the officer noticed cigar odor in the vehicle and characterized the smoker as “excessively”
puffing on a cigar. Id. However, there were additional facts in Brumfield that the Court of
Appeals relied on: when the officer was driving alongside the car, Brumfield was “slouched
low” in the passenger seat puffing excessively on a cigar while the driver was hunched forward
toward the steering wheel in what appeared to have be “an effort to conceal Brumfield’s activity
13

from the officer's view.” Id., at 916. Additionally, the occupants gave changing and actually
conflicting stories about where they were going – which the Court interpreted as “an effort at
officer deception”; the driver told the officer he had “no idea” what was in his trunk despite
having told the officer he had been traveling for three days; and finally, there was a cooked pork
chop in a backpack, which based on the officer’s training and experience, indicated an “attempt
to distract a drug dog.” Id. A majority4 of the Court of Appeals concluded that these facts, in
their aggregate, were sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in the car,
justifying extending the detention. Id.
By contrast, and although Officer Cagle stated his personal experience was that the rate at
which the occupants were smoking was not typical of the way most people smoked (9/8/17 Tr.,
p.12, Ls.7-13), he also testified that people who are stopped by state patrol officers typically get
nervous, and that “nervous people smoke fresh-lit cigarettes very fast.” (Aug.Tr., p.30, Ls.13.)
Based on this testimony, “rapid” smoking of cigarettes is typical in this situation, not unusual; it
is certainly not indicative of criminal activity.
c.

Slightly Lowered Windows And A Tilted Sunroof Are Typical Where
Occupants Are Smoking; The Facts Are Not Indicative Of Criminal
Activity

The fact that the windows were slightly lowered and the sunroof lifted in the back is not
indicative of criminal activity; it is normal behavior – if not essential – given that the occupants

4

Chief Judge Schwartzman wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, which begins:
I respectfully dissent. As noted eloquently in U.S. v. Bloomfield: “The
Fourth Amendment is still part of the Constitution. The police cannot be allowed
to engage, without reasonable suspicion, in intrusive practices likely to invade the
privacy of a large number of innocent citizens in the name of drug interdiction.”
40 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir.1994, McMillian, J., dissenting.) I would find that the
fifty-minute-long detention was not based on reasonable and articulable suspicion,
but instead was based entirely on Black’s subjective instinct and hunch.
136 Idaho at 918-19.
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were smoking. Moreover, there is no indication the windows were opened in response to the
police car’s activated lights; on the contrary, it is apparent from the dashcam video that the
sunroof’s wind deflector was up when the officer had pulled in behind the Audi, indicating the
sunroof was open before the officer signaled for the Audi to stop (see Ex.A, 17:59:30), which is
also consistent with the act of smoking. There is no evidence that the passenger side windows
were not already lowered the few inches, before the officer had activated his emergency lights.
There is no evidence, or rational inference to be drawn, that reasonable people would seal
themselves inside a passenger car while one or more of the occupants was smoking, regardless of
inclement weather.

Moreover, cars are typically equipped with heaters, and there is no

indication that on this cold, rainy evening the Audi’s heater would not have been in use. (See
9/8/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-3.)
Far from indicating criminal activity, the “rapid” smoking on the part of the occupants
with the car windows slightly opened is typical, ordinary behavior of innocent motorists who
smoke or travel with others who do. Without additional facts suggestive of drug activity or other
criminal activity, these facts are insufficient to justify prolonging the stop so that the officer can
conduct a new drug investigation. To hold otherwise would create a moral hazard for patrol
officers, since any traffic stop of the countless innocent smokers5 could result in a drug
investigation and prolonged detention, and as such is incompatible with the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonableness.

Cf. State v. Kelly, 160 Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016)

(concluding that using the interstate freeway, despite the fact that it is used by individuals

5

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2016 more than 15 out
of every 100 U.S. adults smoked cigarettes. https://www.cdc.gov/tobacll/data_statistics/fact_
sheets/adult_data/cig_smoking/index.htm (last visited December 20, 2018).
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engaged in a host of criminal activity, “cannot give rise to a reasonable suspicion to search a
vehicle as it would subject thousands of innocent travelers to an invasion of their privacy for no
more reason that the use of the road.”)
D.

Neither The “Inevitable Discovery Doctrine” Nor The “Good Faith Exception To The
Exclusionary Rule” Save The Illegally-Obtained Evidence From Exclusion
The State alternatively argued below that, even if Officer Cagle violated the Fourth

Amendment, suppression could be denied under either the “inevitable discovery doctrine” or the
“good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” (R., pp.81-84.) Although these arguments are
preserved, neither applies in this case and both should be rejected.
1.

The “Inevitable Discovery Doctrine” Does Not Save The Unlawfully-Obtained
Evidence From Exclusion

The “inevitable discovery doctrine” does not apply in this case because that doctrine only
saves the fruits of an unlawful action when the State shows that those fruits “ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31
(2017) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). The exception does not apply just
because the evidence could have been discovered had the same officer acted lawfully instead of
unlawfully. State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015). The exception does not
permit a hypothetical “do-over.” See State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015)
(“Indeed, the inevitable discovery doctrine was never intended to swallow the exclusionary rule
by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did or were doing.”)
In this case, the State offered no evidence that a drug-detection dog was on its way or
otherwise would have arrived at the scene independent of Officer Cagle’s call that prolonged the
stop. Rather, the State’s argument below was that Officer Cagle could have called for the drug
dog without unlawfully prolonging the traffic stop, had the officer known that he should have.
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(See R., pp.85-86.) However, Officer Cagle’s own testimony belies the State’s claim that
discovery of the evidence by lawful means was “inevitable.” Officer Cagle testified he did not
know that he was doing anything illegal or violating anyone’s constitutional rights, and that he
believed he had complied with standard operating procedures; in short, he “took care of the
traffic stop as needed.” (9/8/17 Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.18, L.11.) Given this record, the State has
failed to present any evidence that the drug evidence “ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means.” The inevitable discovery doctrine therefore is not applicable here.
2.

The “Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule” Does Not Save The
Unlawfully-Obtained Evidence From Exclusion

The “good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” does not apply in this case, for
multiple reasons. First, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled, as a matter of state constitutional law,
that the “Leon6 good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” will not be applied by Idaho courts
to save an otherwise unlawful search or seizure. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987 (1992).
Second, the Leon good faith exception, as applied by federal courts to claims under the Fourth
Amendment, applies to an officer’s objective “good faith” reliance on a search warrant despite
the insufficiency of the warrant’s underlying affidavit. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. As expressly
acknowledged by the State below, Mr. Gibbs’ seeks suppression of all fruits of a warrantless
search. (9/8/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-10.) An investigative detention that is not supported by reasonable
suspicion cannot be saved by the Leon good faith exception.
Finally, even if the Leon exception was somehow applicable, the evidence offered by the
State of the officer’s “objective good faith” consisted entirely of the officer’s subjective beliefs
that (1) he did not think he was doing anything illegal, (2) did not think he violated anybody’s

6

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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constitutional rights, (3) did not feel bad about what he did, and (4) did not intentionally delay
the occupants. (9/8/17 Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.18, L.11.) There is no evidence of the officer’s
objective good faith reliance on anything.
Although preserved, and even though the district court declined to rule on either of them,
the State’s arguments for the application of the “good faith” and “inevitable discovery”
exceptions to the exclusionary rule should be rejected by this Court, as neither exception applies
given the record in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gibbs respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
suppression, vacate his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of paraphernalia, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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